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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) Case Nos. 
) 
-v- ) 18235 and 18236 
) 
ROBERT JORDAN, JR. and ) 
TERRY FULLMER, ) 
) 
Defendants and Appellants. ) 
) 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ·THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants appeal from convictions of violations of Section 
76-10-1206.5 U.C.A. (1953) as amended. Appellants claim this 
statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and unconstitutionally 
vague in that the statute infringes on their rights to free 
speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah. Appellants also claim that the physical 
evidence obtained from searches of the persons and property of 
the defendants was obtained in violation of the rights of defend-
ants under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution, Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution 
of Utah, and Utah Code Annotated 76-10-1212. Trial was held in 
this matter before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, sitting with-
our a jury, on December 9, 1981. The verdict of guilty was 
brought in by the Judge, after taking the matter under advisement, 
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on December 14, 1981, and the judgment and sentence was rendered 
on January 22, 1982. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Honorable J. Robert Bullock of 
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah, in and for Utah 
County, sitting without a jury. Defendants appeal from a judg-
ment of guilty entered by Judge Bullock and from the evidentiary 
rulings made by the Judge. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the judgment and conviction 
and a declaration by this Court that Section 76-10-1206.5 U.C.A. 
is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to these defendants. 
In the alternative, appellants seek a remand to the District Court 
for retrial, with instructions to suppress all physical evidence 
obtained from defendants as a result of the unlawful search and 
seizure. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants are an unmarried couple who had lived together 
as husband and wife for some period prior to September 15, 1981. 
For about two years, defendants had been friendly with Holly 
Wilkerson (date of birth: January 8, 1966) and on occasions 
prior to this date they had told her of their interest in photo-
graphy. Specifically, they had occasionally taken pictures of 
each other, and one or two other friends, in the nude. They had 
also told her that they had had some financial trouble and 
pawned their camera. The evidence at trial showed that during 
-2-
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the period of this relationship, up to and including September 
15, 1981, Holly Wilkerson deliberately led defendants to believe 
that she was considerably older than she really was, out of fear 
that they would not consider her as close a friend if they knew 
her true age (T. 134-136). The effect of this evidence was 
controverted by the testimony of Judith Wilkerson, Holly's mother, 
who testified that she had told defendant, Terry Fullmer, either 
in late June or early July of 1980, that her daughter was, at 
that time, only fourteen (T. 143-144). 
Sometime around the first of September, 1981, defendant 
Terry Fullmer, asked Holly Wilkerson if she could borrow Holly's 
Polaroid instant camera, and indicated that she would probably 
want to use it for some nude photography. There was also some 
discussion at that time as to whether Holly would be interested 
in posing in the nude, but apparently no decision was made. On 
September 15, Holly went to the home of defendants with her camera 
and was asked again if she would be interested in posing in the 
nude. She said she was willing, and various pictures were taken 
in which she, and each of the defendants, appeared nude, either 
separately or together (T.122-127). The State alleged that several 
of the pictures contained "simulated sex acts", but the Court 
appears to have made no ruling on that contention. The evidence 
was uncontroverted that no pressure of any kind was brought to 
bear on Miss Wilkerson to pose, that no actual sex acts took 
place involving her and either of the defendants on that date, 
and that no discussions were had concerning commercial use of the 
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photographs (T. 136-137). 
On or about November 1, 1981, a search warrant was issued 
for the residence of defendants based upon information from a 
confidential police informant which resulted in the seizure of 
265 photographs (T. 128-129), unexposed film, flash cubes, a cloth 
sack, and a General Electric color television set (T.85). Thirty 
of the photographs were offered and received as evidence over the 
objection of the defendants (T. 132-133). (Although the Court 
reserved ruling on the admissibility of the photographs as to 
defendant Jordan, in view of the Court's finding of guilty it is 
assumed that the Court received those exhibits as to Jordan as 
well.) As a result of that visit, a search warrant was obtained, 
and defendants were arrested and prosecuted under an Information 
which recited as follows: 
The undersigned, Pete Hanson, under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendants committed 
the crimes of: 
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF A MINOR, a second degree felony, 
at Utah County, Utah, on or about September 15, 1981, 
in violation of Section 76-10-1206.5, Utah Criminal Code, 
as amended, in that they, at the time and place afore-
said, knowingly and intentionally used, persuaded, induced 
or enticed Holly Wilkerson, a minor, to pose in the nude 
for the purpose of photographing, filming, recording, or 
displaying sexual or simulated sexual conduct. 
Defendants were each convicted under that Information, and from 
those convictions, they appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 76-10-1206.5 U.C.A. IS INVALID ON ITS FACE 
AS At.'! UNCONSTITUTIONAL INFRINGEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF 
FREE SPEECH. 
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The 1979 session of the Utah Legislature passed Section 
76-10-1206.5 as a part of a nation-wide drive to prohibit the 
use of minors in pornographic photographs and films. That section 
was amended by the 1981 Legislature to broaden the language so as 
to prohibit the photography of minors in the nude. That section 
reads as follows: (1981 amendments are underlined) 
Section 76-10-1206.5. Sexual exploitation of minors. 
(1) A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a 
minor who knowingly employs, uses, persuades, induces, 
entices or coerces any minor to pose in the nude for 
the purpose of sexual arousal of any person or for 
profit or to engage in any sexual or simulated sexual 
conduct for the purpose of photographing, filming, re-
cording or displaying in any way the sexual or simulated 
sexual conduct. 
(2) Any person who photographs, films, or records in 
any way minors in the nude for the purpose of sexual 
arousal of any person or for profit or engaged in any 
sexual or simulated sexual conduct is guilty of sexual 
exploitation of a minor. 
(3) Any person who displays, distributes, possesses 
for the purpose of distributing, or sells material 
depicting minors in the nude dr engaging in sexual 
or simulated sexual conduct is guilty of sexual exploi-
tation of minors. 
(4) It is not a defense to this section that the 
person who is charged with sexual exploitation of a 
minor is parent, legal guardian or other person exer-
cising legal control of the child who was the subject 
of the exploitation. 
(5) A violation of this section is a felony of the 
second degree. 
The Information under which defendants were charged and convicted 
appears to be a conglomeration of the new and old language in sub-
paragraph (1). The exact nature of the conduct charged against 
these defendants, and that proven at trial, will be examined later. 
-5-
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For the present, however, it is sufficient to note that a finding 
that the defendants knowingly used a minor to pose in the nude for 
either the sexual arousal of any person or for profit, while photo-
graphing her, is enough to obtain a conviction for violation of 
this code section. Defendants contend that the broad language of 
the statute renders it invalid on its face, whether or not the 
conduct of these defendants could have been constitutionally 
proscribed by a narrowly drawn statute. 
In the case of Doran vs. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 930(1975), 
the United States Supreme Court affirmed a temporary injunction 
issued against enforcement of a town ordinance prohibiting top-
less dancing. Plaintiffs, who sought declaratory relief against 
the ordinance of a town in New York State, were the operators of 
three bars, dispensing alcoholic beverages and providing topless 
dancing as entertainment for its customers. The Court, in sus-
taining the injunction against enforcement of the ordinance~ 
referred to its previous decision in California vs. LaRue, 409 
U.S. 109(1972). That decision held that the powers of the states 
to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages under the Twenty-first 
Amendment, outweigh any First Amendment interest in nude dancing 
and that a state can therefore ban such dancing in bars, under 
its power to license the dispensing of liquor. The Court, never-
theless, indicated preliminarily that it was proper to enjoin 
the enforcement of this law, because of its overbreadth. The 
Court observed: 
In the present case, a challenged ordinance applies 
not merely to places which serve liquor, but to many 
other establishments as well. The District Court 
observed, we believe correctly: 
-6-
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"The local ordinance here attacked not only prohibits 
topless dancing in bars but also prohibits any female 
from appearing in 'any public place' with uncovered 
breasts. There is no limit to the imterpretation of 
the term 'any public place'. It could include the 
theater, town hall, opera house, as well as a public 
market place, street or any place of assembly, indoors 
or outdoors. Thus, this ordinance would prohibit the 
performance of the 'Ballet Africains' and a number of 
other works of unquestionable artistic and socially 
redeeming significance." 364F Supp., at 483. 
We have previously held that even though a statute or 
ordinance may be constitutionally applied to the 
activities of a particular defendant, that defendant 
may challenge it on the basis of over-breadth if it 
is so drawn as to sweep within its ambit protected 
speech or expression of other persons not before the 
Court. As we said in Grayned vs. City of Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104, 114, 92 s.ct. 2294, 2302, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 
(1972): 
"Because over-broad laws, like vague ones, deter 
privileged activity, our cases firmly establish 
Appellant's standing to raise an overbreadth chal-
lenge." 422 U.S. at 933. 
Appellants in this case, then, clearly have the right to 
challenge the statute in question, even if the acts alleged by 
the State in this particular instance could be validly prohibited. 
A long line of cases on both the State and Federal level 
have made it clear that photographs, movies and other forms of 
artistic expression, come within the purview of the First Amend-
ment protection against infringement of free speech. Also, a 
long line of cases on the Federal level indicate that the Federal 
prohibitions against infringement of free speech apply to the 
States, under the Fourteenth Amendment. Utah, of course, has its 
own similar prohibition, in Article I, Section 15. The United 
-7-
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States Supreme Court has dealt with the question of what limits 
States may put on artistic expression in books, photographs and 
films, on several occasions. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476 (1957) the Court stated: 
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social 
importance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, 
even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of 
opinion - have the full protection of the (First Amend-
ment) guarantees, unless excludable because they encroach 
upon the limited area of more important interests. But 
implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the 
rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming 
social importance. 354 U.S. at 484 
The Supreme Court, in that case 1 set standards under which the 
Court could ban production or distribution of books, photographs 
and films, as obscene. Those standards, however, were found to 
be difficult to apply, and the Court re-examined them and set more 
concrete standards in the case of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15 (1972): 
State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials 
must be carefully limited. (citations omitted). As a 
result, we now confine the permissable scope of such 
regulation to works which depict or describe sexual 
conduct. That conduct must be specifically defined by 
the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively 
construed. A state offense must also be limited to works 
which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest 
in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently 
offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value. 
The basic guideline for the trier of fact must be: (a) 
whether "the average person applying contemporary community 
standards" would find that the work taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest, (citations omitted); 
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently 
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as 
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value. 413 U.S. at 23 through 24. 
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The Court went on to indicate that some freedom of defini-
tion was to be accorded to individual states, and to give examples 
of what a state might regulate, as follows: 
We emphasize that it is not our function to propose 
regulatory schemes for the States. That must await 
their concrete legislative efforts. It is possible, 
however, to give a few plain examples of what a state 
statute could define for regulation under part (b) of 
the standard announced in this opinion, supra: 
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions 
of ultimate sex acts, normal or perverted, actual or 
simulated. (b) Patently offensive representation or 
descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and 
lewd exibition of the genitals. 413 U.S. at 25. 
And, for one further clarification as to what types of 
materials could be excluded from the public, the Court stated thusly: 
Under the holdings announced today, no one will be 
subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of 
obscene materials unless these materials depict or 
describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the regulating state law, as 
written or construed. 413 U.S. at 27. 
The Legislature of the State of Utah, then, has taken an 
act that was originally designed to protect minors against their 
use in pronography, and greatly expanded the types of material 
prohibited. This expansion makes the law unconstitutionally 
overbroad. The Court in Miller v. California clearly stated the 
standards of sexual conduct, the depiction of which may be pro-
hibited, which standards do not exist in the law as modified by 
the 1981 Legislature. 
How far the statute at issue here goes beyond the limits 
allowed by Miller v. California is illustrated by the definition 
of nudity contained in Section 76-10-1201 (6) U.C.A. (1953) as 
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amended. The definitions, as part of Title 76, Chapter 26, Part 
12 of the Criminal Code, are meant to be used with all portions 
of that part. That section reads as follows: 
'Nudity' means the showing of a human male or female 
genitals, pubic area, or buttocks, with less than an 
opaque covering, or any portion thereof below the top 
of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals 
in a discrenably turgid state. 
Reading that definition into the statute renders the statute not 
only hopelessly overbroad, but absolutely ridiculous and foolish. 
The statute prohibits, on its face, even a parent from taking a 
picture of a three month old daughter wearing nothing but a diaper, 
and then submitting it to any kind of a photography contest where 
prizes (profit) are offered. To further illustrate the breadth 
of the statute, counsel for appellants purchased a greeting card 
during the month of April, 1982, in a Grand Central store in 
Salt Lake City. A copy of that greeting card is included in the 
Brief as appendix A. Obviously, the person on the first page of 
the greeting card is a female. If, as is only a guess, the child 
on the inside of the greeting card is also a female, "any person 
who displays, distributes, possesses for the purpose of distribu-
ting,or sells" this card in the State of Utah is guilty of a viola-
tion of the same act for which defendants have been convicted. 
Under this law, many uses of children in advertising, especially 
products for babies, would be banned in this state. That may not 
have been what the Legislature intended to accomplish, but that is 
the clear meaning of the act. In the 1968 case of Ginsberg vs. 
New York, 390 U.S. 629, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a New York 
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State law which protected minors from the sale of books and 
magazines, including "girlie magazines", which were not obscene 
for adults. In doing so, the Court upheld the concept of "variable 
obscenity". In that case, the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibit-
ing the sale to minors of pictures that were "harmful to minors" 
and had: 
that quality of ... representation ... of nudity 
(which) . . . (i) predominately appeals to the 
prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and 
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in 
the adult community as a whole with respect to what is 
suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly 
without redeeming social importance for minors. 390 U.S. 
at 633. 
The Court there, in effect, found that the State of New York was 
within its rights in defining pornography more broadly for minors, 
than for adults. The Court went on to say, however, that the New 
York State of Appeals had defined the term "harmful to minors" as 
"virtually identical to the Supreme Court's most recent statement 
of the elements of obscenity." 390 U.S. at 643. 
The Ginsberg case was decided the same day as its companion 
case of Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676,.(19! 
While upholding the New York law, the Supreme Court struck down a 
Dallas City ordinance which prohibited a motion picture exhibitor 
from admitting children under 16 to films classified by a motion 
picture classification board as "not suitable for young persons." 
That term was defined in the ordinance as including films which 
described or portrayed: 
Nudity beyond the customary limits of candor in the 
community, or sexual promiscuity or extra-marital or 
abnormal sexual relations in such a manner as to be, 
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in the judgment of the Board, likely to incite or 
encourage delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the 
part of young persons or to appeal to their prurient 
interest. 390 U.S. at 681. 
The Court there found that definition to be unconstitutionally 
vague and quoted Judge Fuld in People vs. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 
258 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1965) in pointing out: 
"It is, however, essential that legislation aimed at 
protecting children from allegedly harmful expression 
-- no less than legislation enacted with respect to 
adults -- be clearly drawn and that the standards 
adopted be reasonably precise so that those who are 
governed by the law and those that administer it will 
understand its meaning and application. 258 N.Y.S.2d 
at 393, 390 U.S. at 689. 
What both statutes had in common was that they attempted to pro-
hibit exposure of children to materials involving nudity in a way 
that was unfit for people of their age. Obviously, exposure to 
nudity itself, was insufficient, or the Court would have upheld 
the Dallas ordinance as well. 
That children may not be protected from all nudity was made 
very clear and firm in a much later Supreme Court case, that of 
Erznoznik vs. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). In that 
case, the City of Jacksonville, Florida, passed the following 
ordinance: 
330.313 Drive-in theaters, films visible from public 
streets or public places. It shall be unlawful and 
it is hereby declared a public nuisance for any ticket 
seller, ticket taker, usher, motion picture projection 
machine operator, manager, owner, or any other person 
connected with or employed by any drive-in theater in 
the city to exhibit, or aid or assist in exhibiting, 
any motion picture, slide, or other exhibit in which 
the human male or female bare buttocks, human female 
bare breasts, or human bare pubic areas are shown, if 
such motion picture, slide, or other exhibit is visible 
from any public street or public place. Violation of 
this section shall be punishable as a class C offense. 
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The City of Jacksonville cited several grounds on which the 
ordinance could be upheld, despite admitting that it went "far 
beyond the permissible restraints on obscenity ... " 422 U.S. 
208. The Court found no merit in any of the grounds, including 
its attempts to protect children. The Court addressed this 
issue by saying: 
Appelee also attempts to support the ordinance as an 
exercise of the city's undoubted police power to pro-
tect children. Appellee maintains that even though it 
cannot prohibit the display of films containing nudity 
to adults, the present ordinance is a reasonable means 
of protecting minors from this type of visual influence. 
It is well settled that a State or municipality can 
adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials 
available to youth than on those available to adults. 
(citations omitted) Nevertheless, minors are entitled 
to a significant measure of First Amendment protection, 
(citations omitted), and only in relatively narrow and 
well-defined circumstances may government bar public 
dissemination of protected materials to them. (citations 
omitted) . 
In this case, assuming the ordinance is aimed at pro-
hibiting youth from viewing the films, the restriction 
is broader than permissible. The ordinance is not 
directed against sexually explicit nudity, nor is it 
otherwise limited. Rather, it sweepingly forbids dis-
play of all films containing any uncovered buttocks or 
breasts, irrespective of context or pervasiveness. Thus, 
it would bar a film containing a picture of a baby's 
buttocks, the nude body of a war victim, or scenes 
from a culture in which nudity is indigenous. The 
ordinance also might prohibit newsreel scenes of the 
opening of an art exhibit as well as shots of bathers 
on a beach. Clearly all nudity cannot be deemed obscene 
even to minors. (citations omitted) Nor can such a 
broad restriction be justified by any other governmental 
interest pertaining to minors. Speech that is neither 
obscene as to youth nor subject to some other legitimate 
proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the 
young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks 
unsuitable for them. 422 U.S. 212-214. 
Clearly, the Legislature of the State of Utah has over-
stepped the bounds set by the U.S. Supreme Court in its attempts 
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to protect minors in this constitutionally protected area. 
Section 76-10-1206.5 U.C.A. is overbroad in its entirety, and 
must be invalidated in its entirety. 
The Utah statute at issue here is one of many child por-
nography laws which have been enacted, mostly within the last 
three years. As of March, 1981, forty-six states had passed 
similar laws. (The material set forth herein as to the survey 
of various state laws was obtained primarily from the brief of 
Herald Price Fahringer, Paul Cambria and Barbara Davies Eberal, 
dated March, 1981, and submitted to the New York Court of Appeals 
in the case of People vs. Ferber, to be discussed later. Most 
of the information, with the exception of case law, contained 
therein about laws of other states has not been independently 
verified by counsel.) In addition, Congress passed a Sexual 
Exploitation of Children law in 1978. The federal· law punishes 
anyone who "employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or 
coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any 
other person to engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the 
purpose of producing any visual or print medium depicting such 
conduct ... "and who then transports the material in interstate 
or foreign commerce. (18 uses Section 2251). The federal re-
quirement that the conduct be sexually explicit is defined in 18 
USCS Section 2253 to parallel the requirements for obscenity as 
set forth in Miller vs. California. Twenty-five of the forty-six 
states enacting child pornography laws have similar definitions 
of sexual performance, limiting such laws in their effect to 
material that is legally obscene. Of those states that did not 
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have obscenity requirements, none had yet been upheld as valid 
by their state's highest court, as of March, 1981. Two of the 
twenty-one state statutes not requiring sexual explicit conduct 
of the sort outlined in Miller vs. California have been struck 
down. The Texas law was declared unconstitutional in Graham vs. 
Hill, 444 F.Supp.584 (W.D.Tex. 1978). In that case, the owner 
and manager of a movie theater and bookstore sued in Federal 
Court for injunctive and declaratory relief from Section 43.25 
of the Texas Penal Code which provided, in part, as follows: 
(a} A person commits an offense if, knowing the content 
of the material, he sells, commercially distributes, 
commercially exhibits, or possesses for sale, commercial 
distribution, or commercial exhibition any motion picture 
or photograph showing a person younger than seventeen 
years of age observing or engaging in sexual conduct. 
The Court, in ruling that section unconstitutional, referred to 
several of the cases cited by appellants above, and then stated: 
It is apparent that the statute could be applied to a 
variety of works which, taken as a whole, very plainly 
would not be the type of 'hard core' pornography re-
ferred to in the Supreme Court's opinion in Miller. 
444 F. Supp. at 592. 
In light of the total failure to require that the material 
proscribed by Section 43.25 be obscene, the Court cannot 
avoid the conclusion that the statute clearly is over-
broad and that its deterrent effect on protected conduct 
is both real and substantial, especially considering the 
severe sanctions for violation of the statute. 444 F.Supp. 
at 593. 
The New York State Child Pornography Law includes two parallel 
sections which read as follows: 
Section 263.10 N.Y. Penal Law (McKinney) Promoting an 
obscene sexual performance by a child. A person is 
guilty of promoting an obscene sexual performance by a 
child when knowing the character and content thereof, he 
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produces, directs or promotes any obscene performance 
which includes sexual conduct by a child less than 
sixteen years of age. 
Section 263.15 Promoting a sexual performance by a child. 
A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by 
a child when knowing the character and content thereof, 
he produces, directs or promotes any performance which 
includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen 
years of age. 
While no attack has been made against the constitutionality 
of Section 263.10, Section 263.15 has been declared unconstitutional 
by two Courts. In St. Martins Press, Inc. vs.r. Carey, 440 F.Supp. 
1196(S.D. N.Y. 1977) the publisher of a book to be used by parents 
for educating their children about sex filed an action for declara-
tory judgment in Federal Court. That Court issued a preliminary 
injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance with regard 
to the book published by plaintiff, saying that there was a serious 
question as to whether the state law was overbroad in its applica-
tion. That case was reversed on appeal in St. Martins Press, Inc. 
vs. Carey, 605 F.2d 41 (2nd Cir, 1979) and plaintiff's Complaint 
was dismissed, on procedural grounds only, without reaching the 
merits of the overbreadth contention. 
That same New York law was once again attacked and declared 
unconstitutionally overbroad in the case of People vs. Ferber, 
52 N.Y. 2d 674, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981). The New York 
Court of Appeals found the State's interest in protecting minors 
from harmful performances was insufficient to overcome the First 
Amendment issues involved, and explained its holding by saying: 
By the same token the effect on freedom of expression 
is the same whether the govenment bluntly seeks to 
censor what it finds offensive, or more benignly acts 
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to protect the health and welfare of the performers. 
Thus, no matter what the government's objective, First 
Amendment standards remain applicable whenever the 
effect of a government regulation is to curtail pro-
tected modes of expression. 439 N.Y.S.2d at 865. 
In short, the statute discriminates against films and 
other visual portrayals of non-obscene adolescent sex 
solely on the basis of their content, and since no 
justification has been shown for the distinction other 
than special legislative distaste for this type of 
portrayal, the statute cannot be sustained. 
We merely hold that those who present plays, films, and 
books portraying adolescence cannot be singled out for 
punishment simply because they deal with adolescent sex 
in a realistic but non-obscene manner. 439 N.Y.S.2d 
at 866. 
The statute struck down in the Graham and Ferber cases 
were less all-inclusive than the statute here in Utah. Where 
exactly the line may properly lie between First Amendment rights 
and the State's interest in protecting children has not yet been 
fully decided. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has~- : 
accepted the New York case for argument, and that case may yet 
be overruled. There is little doubt, however, that the line is 
well short of the overbroad provisions of the Utah Act. 
The same legislative session that passed the statute at 
issue here also passed Section 76-10-1229 U.C.A. (1953) as amended. 
That section states, in part, "No person, including a franchisee, 
shall knowingly distribute by wire or cable any pornographic or 
indecent material to subscribers." Indecent material is defined 
by Section 76-10-1227 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, which was passed 
by the 1979 Legislature. Indecent material is defined as either 
"description or depictions of illicit sex or sexual immorality" 
or "nude or partially denuded figures". This act was enjoined by 
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the Federal District Court for the District of Utah before it 
went into effect. On January 12, 1982, that statute was declared 
unconstitutionally overbroad and the injunction was made permanent 
by Judge Bruce Jenkins in the case of Home Box Office, Inc. vs. 
Wilkinson, Civil No.C81-0331J (D.Utahl982) .Some of Judge Jenkins' 
comments are appropriate to review here: 
Construing Section 76-10-1229 according to the fair 
import and even the plain meaning of its terms, it 
becomes readily apparent that it seeks to deal with _ 
subject matter beyond hard-core pornography -- to go 
beyond Miller -- and to do so without any of the safe-
guards mandated by Miller. 
For example, through the definitions adopted by reference 
from Section 76-10-1227(2), 'nude or partially denuded 
figures' are encompassed within the reach of Section 76-
10-1229(4), it is well settled that nudity falls within 
the protection afforded by the First Amendment, Jenkins 
vs. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974); Schad vs. Mt. 
Ephriam, 452 u.s, , 101 s.ct. 2176 (1981), even when 
viewed by minors. Erznoznik vs. Cit.y of Jacksonville, 422 
U.S. 205, 213 & n.10 (1975). To that extent, the statute 
is clearly encroaching upon protected expression in an 
unconstitutional manner and is facially defective. pg. 12 
A court must look at the context of the material in the 
manner specified by Miller. Yet under Section 1229(4) 
sex and unprotected obscenity are made synonymous. It 
is elementary that merely calling something obscene 
doesn't make it so. Merely labeling something indecent 
doesn't make it so. 
Counsel for the State argues that such a broad extension 
of legislative authority heretofore proscribed areas may 
be justified by the State's interests in protecting 
children, and that materials accessible to children 
should be governed by standards more strict than the 
Miller standards. Cf. Ginsberg vs. New York, 390 U.S. 
629 (1968) 
While in Ginsberg vs. New York, the Supreme Court 
adopted a variation of the then current test of 
obscenity announced in Roth vs. United States, supra, 
and Memoirs vs. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1~66) 
(plurality opinion) counsel cites no case in which the 
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court has had opportunity to consider that issue in 
light of Miller. See Erznoznik vs. City of Jacksonville, 
Suora, 422 U.S. at 213 n.10. Since Ginsberg, the Court 
has expressed the view that 'minors are entitled to a 
significant measure of First Amendment protection' ,see 
Tinker vs. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), 
and only in relatively narrow and well-defined circum-
stances may government bar public dissemination of 
protected materials to them ... Erzndznik vs. City of 
Jacksonville, supra, 422 U.S. at 212-213. pg. 13. 
Section 76-10-1229(1) and (4) is unconstitutionally over-
broad as to minors. It is unconstitutionally overbroad 
as to everyone. pg. 14. 
Even though many of us may not approve or enjoy the forms 
of expression that occur along the borderline that has 
been drawn by the United States Supreme Court, we tolerate 
them. pg. 22. 
Like the statute struck down by the Federal Court last January, 
this statute is unconstitutionally overbroad as to everyone. 
The State Legislature does not have the power to protect minors, 
or anyone else, from constitutionally protected freedom of expres-
sion simply by calling it "indecent", and does not have the power 
to prohibit the conduct sought to be prohibited in Section 76-10-
1206.5. This Court has no choice but to declare the statute 
unconstitutionally overbroad on its face and to reverse the con-
victions of defendants herein. 
POINT II 
SECTION 76-10-1206.5 U.C.A. IS INVALID ON ITS FACE 
AND AS APPLIED TO THESE DEFENDANTS AS AN UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL INFRINGEMENT UPON THEIR RIGHT TO PRIVACY. 
As indicated above, the Act at issue, in its original form, 
was intended to fight the commercial and sexual exploitation of 
minors. Most of the case law dealing with matters at issue have 
to do with commercial production and dissemination of allegedly 
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sexual materials. In this case, the conduct which took place 
was between friends, in the privacy of the home of defendants, 
and was not done for commercial use or profit. While no direct 
evidence was introduced to the effect that anyone involved was 
"sexually aroused", it would appear from the Court's rulings 
that a finding of sexual arousal was made by the Court. It is 
clear that the decision to pose for the pictures was made volun-
tarily by the minor involved (T.136-137). -The United States 
Supreme Court had occasion to rule on the right to privacy 
regarding possession of alleged pornographic material in the 
case of Stanley vs. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The defendant 
in that case was convicted for possession of obscene matter, and 
argued that a state may not punish mere private possession of 
obscene matter. The Supreme Court agreed, and commented: 
This right to receive information and ideas, regard-
less of their social worth (citations omitted) is 
fundamental to our free society. Moreover, in the 
context of this case -- a prosecution for mere posses-
sion of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a 
person's own home -- that right takes on an added 
dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be 
free, except in very limited circumstances, from un-
wanted government intrusions into one's privacy. 394 
U.S. at 564. 
He is asserting the right to read or observe what he 
pleases -- the right to satisfy his intellectual and 
emotional needs in the privacy of his own home. He 
is asserting the right to be free from State inquiry 
into the contents of his library. Georgia contends 
that Appellant does not have these rights, that there 
are certain types of materials that the individual may 
not read or even possess . . . but we think that mere 
categorization of these films as 'obscene' is insuffi-
cient justification for such a drastic invasion of 
personal liberties granted by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Whatever may be the justifications for 
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other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not 
think they reach into the privacy of one's own 
home. If the First Amendment means anything, it 
means that a State has no business telling a man, 
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may 
read or what films he may watch. Our whole consti-
tutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving 
government the power to control mens' minds. 394 
U.S. at 565. 
Admittedly, this case differs from the Stanley case in 
that the acts complained of here involve more than one person, 
one of whom is a minor. It appears, however, that the minor 
herself may be constitutionally protected when engaging in 
private conduct in the home of a friend, as much as the defend-
ants may, in their own home. It appears quite.clear that minors, 
at least under some circumstances, are entitled to guarantees of 
free speech, much as adults are. In Tinker vs. Des Moines School 
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) the United States Supreme Court 
held that high school students, aged 13, 15, and 16, were entitled 
to First Amendment protection against a school district rule 
which prohibited them from wearing arm bands to protest the war 
in Vietnam. In Gambino vs. Fairfax County School Board, 564 F.2d 
157 (4th Cir. 1977) high school students were granted an injunc-
tion against their school board, prohibiting the interference 
of the school board with their publication of an article about 
birth control in a school newspaper. In the case of Shanley vs. 
Northeast Independent School Drstrict, Bexar Cd.Unty, Texas, 462 
F.2d 960 (1972) the Court invalidated a school board policy pro-
hibiting the dissemination of an unofficial "underground" student 
newspaper which was published and distributed off campus, but only 
to students. 
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It should be noted here once again that the statute under 
which Appellants were convicted prescribes the same penalties for 
a parent or legal guardian of a child who photographs his nude 
child, as for a stranger. This is in contrast to Section 76-10-1206 
which prohibits distributing harmful material to a minor, and 
exempts parents or legal guardians from its prohibitions. It is 
the contention of Appellants herein that the statute is also 
overbroad in that it prohibits acts done between consenting people 
in the privacy of their homes, which do not amount to the promo-
tion of obscenity; and also that it interferes illegally with the 
relationship of a parent to his child. Returning once again to 
the Tinker case, the Southern California Law Review in its analysis 
of the case, found it to be one in which the state was prohibited 
from unwarranted interference in the family relationship. In 
describing the Tinker matter as a family .rights case, the Law 
Review found that: 
The students' decision to wear arm bands, according 
to the Court, was reached at a meeting of both adults 
and students, and the petitioners' parents concurred 
in the decision. In those circumstances the students' 
rights to advocate a particular position gains con-
siderably more strength, having behind it not merely 
the weight of childish ratiocination and corrunitment, 
but also the support of parental counsel on which 
the students quite justifiably are entitled to rely. 
It is not merely 'a symbolic battle between adults, 
each using children as sacrificial pawns,' for the 
children do have an interest in the matter. But that 
interest is inextricably bound up in familial ties: 
it is the right to be brought up, and to behave despite 
state objection, in a way that parents have experienced 
and found valuable. 51 S.Cal. L.Rev. 769 at 784. 
Other Courts have also been faced with attempted State 
interference in the relationships of parents with their children, 
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and other minors in their home. Courts in several states have 
not only found that state prohibitions against serving alcohol 
to minors did not apply to either parents or those who have had 
minors as guests in their home. In the case of People vs. Martell, 
16 N.Y.2d 245, 264 N.Y.S.2d 913, (N.Y. 1965), the New York Court 
of Appeals had occasion to construe a state statute which made 
guilty of a misdemeanor a person who "sells or gives away, or 
causes or permits or procures to be sold or given away to any 
child actually or apparently under the age of eighteen years any 
alcoholic beverages as defined by the Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Law", 16 N.Y.2d 246 at 247. The defendant in that case has 
served alcoholic beverages to four children under the age of 
eighteen years several times over a period of six months. She 
contended that the statute did not prohibit private acts done in 
her home, despite the literal language. The Court sidestepped 
the issue of the constitutionality of a prohibition on such 
private activities, by saying: 
We need not go to the question of whether a statute 
would be constitutional which made criminal the service 
of alcoholic beverages, in a residence, to the children 
of the house or to guests under eighteen years of age. 
This appeal can be disposed of by simply holding that 
subdivision three of Section 484 cannot reasonably be 
read as making criminal such dispensing of drinks in 
the home. 16 N.Y.2d 246 at 248. See also People vs. 
Bird, 138 Mich. 31, 100 N.W. 1003 (Mich. 1904) and 
Sfate vs. Hammons, 59 W.Va. 475, 53 S.E. 630 (W.Va. 1906). 
The interest of parents in making decisions for their child-
ren was recognized by Ginsberg Court. The Court there found that 
the state's attempts to keep certain materials from children was 
done in support of that parental right. The Court stated: 
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First of all, constitutional interpretation has 
consistently recognized that the parents' claim 
to authority in their own household to direct the 
rearing of their children is basic in the structure 
of our society. 'It is cardinal with us that the 
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first 
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom 
include preparation for obligations the state can 
neither supply nor hinder.' (citations omitted). 
The Legislature could properly conclude that parents 
and others, teachers for example, who have this 
primary responsibility for childrens' well-being 
are entitled to the support of laws designed to 
aid discharge of that responsibility. Indeed, 
subsection l(f) (ii) of Section 484-h expressly 
recognizes the parental role in assessing sex-
related material harmful to minors according 'to 
prevailing standards in the adult community as a 
whole with respect to what is suitable material for 
minors.' Moreover, the prohibition against sales 
to minors does not bar parents who so desire from 
purchasing the magazines for their children.390 U.S. at 639. 
The statute at issue here is overbroad and constitutionally 
invalid because it interferes with the right of privacy of both 
children and adults, and interferes with their freedom of expres-
sion. Moreover, it interferes with the relationship between 
parents and children, and is an unconstitutional infringement 
in an area where the state has no valid right to regulate. 
POINT III 
SECTION 76-10-1206.5 U.C.A. IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS. 
As referred to in the Statement of Facts at the beginning 
of this Brief, the Information charged the defendants with using 
"a minor, to pose in the nude while simulating sexual conduct ... " 
Arguments have been presented regarding the insufficiency of 
nudity as a grounds for suppression of the behavior. The State's 
position, of course, appears to be that the nudity in itself was 
a sufficient violation of the law to justify conviction. The Supreme 
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Court, in its Miller vs. California decision indicated that among 
the types of material that could be suppressed as obscene were 
"patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate 
sex acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated." 413 U.S. at 
25. Obviously, the restrictions put on the types of material to 
.be prohibited in the Miller vs. California decision are tighter 
than those in the Utah Code. The point to be made here, however, 
is the additional requirement of the Miller vs. California case 
that the depiction not only be "patently offensive" but that it 
be of "sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable 
State law." 413 U.S. at 24. The Utah Code does indeed define 
"sexual conduct" in Section 76-10-1201(7). Nowhere, however, does 
it define "simulating sexual conduct," the conduct charged here. 
At trial, when the prosecutor introduced thirty (30) photographs 
as evidence of the· crime, counsel for defendant Jordan objected 
to the introduction of certain of the photographs, which did not 
appear to include sexual or simulated sexual conduct (T. 128). 
Counsel for defendant Fullmer did not join in that objection 
because of our contention that the charge of nudity was suf-
ficient to invalidate the charges in their entirety. At any 
rate, counsel for both parties participated in separating those 
in which simulated sex acts might have occurred, and those in 
which no such acts could have occurred, because only one person 
was in those photographs. No admission was made by anyone 
representing the defense that any of the photographs did indeed 
show "simulated sexual conduct" (T.131). In our final argument, 
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it was our contention, and it remains our contention here, that 
the term "simulated sexual conduct" is one that does not exist 
in Utah law, and that defendants could not have known what con-
duct was proscribed, due to the lack of definition. 
It is a settled rule of law that a statute written so vaguely 
that it does not set out a clear standard of the behavior prohibited 
is void as the denial of due process of law, as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah. That standard was set 
out, among other places, in Champlin Refining Company vs. Corpora-
tion Commissioner, 286 U.S. 210, 52 S.Ct.559 (1932) where the United 
States Supreme Court said: 
In light of our decisions it appears upon a mere 
inspection that these general words and phrases are 
so vague and indefinite that any penalty prescribed 
for their violation constitutes a denial of due pro-
cess of law. It is not the penalty itself that is 
invalid, but the exaction of obedience to a rule or 
standard that is so vague and indef inate as to be no 
rule or standard at all. (citations omitted) 52 S.Ct. 
at 568. 
In a Utah case involving the regulation of massage parlors, Jensen 
vs. Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners, 530 P.2d 3 (Utah 1974) 
this Court invalidated a county ordinance on the basis of vagueness: 
The trial Court was of the opinion that the language of 
the ordinance was so vague and uncertain as to render it 
invalid. We conclude that the determination by the 
trial court was correct. A person who might wish to 
enter the field covered by the ordinance would be unable 
to determine from this wording what qualifications or 
skill would be necessary to qualify for a license. It 
is noted that the ordinance uses the term 'massage 
therapist' but nowhere is that term defined. 530 P.2d at 4. 
In the instant case, sexual conduct is defined by Section 76-10-
1201(7) as follows: 
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'Sexual conduct' means acts of masturbation, sexual 
intercourse or any touching of a person's clothed or 
unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, if the 
person is a female, breast, whether alone or between 
members of the same or opposite sex or between humans 
and animals in an act of apparent or actual sexual 
stimulation or gratification. 
The undisputed testimony at trial was that there was no sexual 
activity between the minor and either of the defendants on the 
day in question (T.137). The definition of sexual conduct 
requires a 'touching' of certain parts of the body of another. 
One would have to assume that "simulated sexual conduct" might 
require a "simulated touching", but such a term is almost im-
possible to understand. If that term were construed to mean 
"almost touching" the situation is only made worse, for lack of 
guidelines as to how far away the two people could be, and still 
be "almost touching". The total lack of guidelines, along with 
the apparent difficulty in using a :'common sense" approach to the 
meaning, renders the term "simulated sexual conduct" without 
meaning under the law. If this term does not have a precise 
meaning, as it would appear the United States Supreme Court has 
said it must, defendants cannot be held responsible for violating 
the statute prohibiting it. 
Thus, even without the obvious overbreadth, the statute 
must fail for vagueness on its face, and as applied in the instant 
case. While there was some attempt at trial in this matter to 
separate those photographs which might have involved that conduct 
(simply because there was more than one person in the photograph) 
and those that could not have, no evidence was ever put on that 
the activity portrayed in any photograph was usimulated sexual 
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conduct" and the Court appears to have made no ruling thereon. 
For these additional reasons, the law must be invalidated and 
the charges dismissed. 
POINT IV 
AFFIDAVIT UPON WHICH SEARCH WARRANT WAS ISSUED WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH 
WARRANT. 
The Affidavit supporting the issuance of the search warrant 
in the present case was made by Officer Stewart Winn of the Orem 
City Police Department on the 3rd day of November, 1981. Para-
graph 2 of said Affidavit recites as follows: 
That in that capacity on or about the 3rd day of 
November, 1981, I received information from a con-
fidential informant, whose code name is "Gorgo", that 
a quantity of nude photographs, commonly referred to 
as "child pornography" is being secreted at the address 
of 754 South 50 East, Orem, Utah County, Utah. The 
pornography is in the possession of Terry Fullmer, a 
white female and of Robert Jordan, a black male. The 
minor individual is a 15 year old female runaway by 
the name of Holly Wilkerson. 
Further in paragraph 4, the Affidavit recites: 
... They then showed him a stack of approximately fifty 
polaroid snapshots. They all showed Holly Wilkerson, 
Terry Fullmer and Robert Jordan engaging in, or simu-
lating sex acts. . . (T. 3-4) . 
There was no representation in any of the allegations set 
forth in the Affidavit where the affiant states that he has seen 
the materials sought to be seized nor are the photographs des-
cribed with particularity sufficient to give the Magistrate 
probable cause to believe the materials sought are pornographic. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-10-1212 provides procedural 
requirements which must be met prior to the issuance of a warrant 
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or the seizure of materials alleged to be pornographic. At 
Section 76-10-1212(1), the statute provides: 
An affidavit for search warrant shall be filed with 
the Magistrate describing with specificity the material 
sought to be seized. Where practical, the material 
alleged to be pornographic shall be attached to the 
affidavit for search warrant so as to afford the Magis-
trate the opportunity to examine this material. 
This Court considered the foregoing statute in State v. 
Piepenburg, 602 P.2d 702 where the defendant alleged that the 
issuing Magistrate must personally view the alleged pornography 
before a valid warrant could issue, 602 P.2d at 705. The Court 
ruled that a personal viewing of the alleged pornographic 
materials is not required where the police officer's affidavit 
and accompanying memorandum are sufficiently detailed to give 
the issuing Magistrate an opportunity to 11 searchingly focus" on 
the issue of obscenity. 
In the present case, the Affidavit does not describe with 
particularity the nature of the materials sought to be seized. 
In fact, the affiant had not seen any of the photographs, but 
relied upon the conclusions of the confidential informant. Those 
conclusions constitute double hearsay in addition to their 
conclusory nature. 
The United States Supreme Court has held a search warrant 
based solely upon conclusory assertions of a police officer to 
be constitutionally infirm. In Lee Art Theatre, Inc. vs. Virginia, 
392 U.S. 636, two films were seized by authority of a warrant 
issued by a Magistrate on the basis of an affidavit which stated 
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only the titles of the films and the officer's conclusion that 
they were obscene based upon the officer's personal observation 
of the materials. At 392 U.S. 637, the Court stated: 
However, we need not decide in this case whether the 
Justice of the Peace should have viewed the motion 
picture before issuing the warrant. The procedure 
under which the warrant issued solely upon the conclu-
sory assertions of the police officer without any in-
quiry by the Justice of the Peace into the factual 
bisis for the officer's conclusions was not a procedure 
"designed to focus searchingly on the question of 
obscenity", id. at 732, 81 S.Ct. at 1716, and there-
fore falls short of constitutional requirements demanding 
necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression. 
It would not have been of value for the Magistrate to have made 
inquiry of the off icer-affiant in the present case to determine 
the basis of his conclusions since the officer-affiant had not 
personally viewed the materials sought to be seized, but was only 
reporting the conclusions of a third party. 
Such an affidavit fails to meet the requirements of Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Section 76-10-1212(1), as well 
as the procedures set forth in State vs. Piepenberg, supra, and 
the U.S. Constitutional requirements set forth in Lee Art Theatre, 
Inc. vs. Virginia, supra, and the evidence obtained by authority 
of the warrant issued in the present case should have been 
suppressed. 
POINT V 
THE WARRANT WHICH WAS ISSUED IN THE PRESENT CASE WAS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFECTIVE SINCE IT DID NOT DESCRIBE 
WITH SPECIFICITY THE ITEMS SOUGHT TO BE SEIZED BUT 
LEFT THE DECISION TO DISCRETION OF THE OFFICERS EXECUT-
ING THE WARRANT. 
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The search warrant issued for the seizure of materials in 
the present case describes the items to be seized as follows: 
NOW, THEREFORE YOU AND EACH OF YOU are hereby directed 
to conduct an immediate search during the daylight 
hours of an apartment on the south side of the upper 
level of a red brick four-plex, further identified by 
the number 754 by the door, said apartment being located 
at 754 South 50 East Street, Orem, Utah County, Utah, 
for the presence therein of child pornography, and other 
evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor. (Emphasis 
added) ( T . 6 ) . 
The decision concerning whether particular materials, in 
this case photographs, were pornographic and therefore subject to 
seizure, was left entirely to the discretion of the persons execut-
ing the search warrant. The warrant did not limit the seizure 
even to the photographs briefly described in the Affidavit as 
depicting "sex acts", but broadly authorized the seizure of "child 
pornography and other evidence of sexual exploi ta ti on of a minor", 
leaving to the mind and imagination of the police officers as to 
which items to seize. 
The inventory of property taken by the authority of the 
warrant in this case indicates the extent to which the constitu-
tional restrictions upon such searches may be abused by police 
officers when given such broad discretion. The officers seized a 
quantity of "assorted instant photographs" (actually 265 "nude" 
photographs only 30 of which pictured the juvenile and oniy ten 
of those which could be claimed to picture "simulated sexual 
conduct") , "unexposed 35 mm. film", "flash cubes", "cloth sack", 
"unexposed polaroid film" and a "General Electric color television 
set". 
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It is difficult to imagine what relevance unexposed film, 
a cloth sack and a television set would have to do with "child 
pornography or evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor". 
Further, the seizure of 265 photographs, the majority of which do 
not picture the minor at all, would appear to exceed even the 
broad discretion set forth in the warrant. 
Such a warrant has been determined to be constitutionally 
defective. In Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property at 104 East 
Tenth Street, Kansas City, Missouri, etal., 367 U.S. 717, the 
Court considered a seizure by warrant of various magazines alleged 
to be obscene. The directions in the warrant as to items seized 
was " ... to search the said premises ... within 10 days after the 
issuance of this warrant by day or night, and ... seize ... (obscene 
materials) and take the same into your possession ... " 367 U.S. 722. 
Following an in depth review of the historical development 
of the law regarding the issues in this area, the Court concluded: 
We believe that Missouri's procedures as applied in 
this case lacked the safeguards which due process 
demands to assure non-obscene material the constitu-
tional protection to which it is entitled. Putting 
to one side the fact that no opportunity was afforded 
the appellants to elicit and contest the reasons .for 
the officer's belief, or otherwise to argue against 
the propriety of the seizure to the issuing Judge, 
still the warrants issued on the strength of the 
conclusory assertions of a single police officer, 
without any scrutiny by the Judge of any materials 
considered by the complainant to be obscene. The 
warrants gave the broadest discretion to the executing 
officers; they merely repeated the language of the 
statute and the complainant specified no publications, 
and left to the individual judgment of each of the many 
police officers involved in the selection of such 
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magazines as in his view constituted "obscene ... 
publications" . 
... In consequence there were suppressed and withheld 
from the market for over two months, 180 publications 
not found obscene. The fact only one-third of the 
publications seized were finally condemned strengthens 
the conclusion that discretion to seize allegedly 
obscene materials cannot be confined to law enforce-
ment officials without greater safeguards than were 
here operative. Procedures which sweep ~so broadly 
and with so little d1scr1m1natiorr~re obviously de-
ficient in techniques required by the ·Due Process 
Clause of the Folirteenth Amendment ·to prevent erosion 
of the constitutional guarantee. 367 U.S. 731, 732. 
(Emphasis added) 
Further, in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. vs. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 
the Court, upon considering a similar warrant stated: 
Based on the conclusory statement of the police investi-
gator that other similarly obscene materials would be 
found at the store, the warrant left it entirely to the 
discretion of the officials conducting the search to 
decide what items were likely obscene and to accomplish 
their seizure. The Fourth Amendment does not permit such 
action. 442 U.S. 325. 
In the present case, where the officers executing the 
warrants were left totally to their own discretion in what items 
to seize, and where, in fact, they seized numerous items which 
were not obscene or related to "child pornography", the search was 
violative of the defendants' Fourth Amendment protections and the 
evidence obtained thereby should have been suppressed. 
POINT VI 
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED BY OFFICERS SHOULD H..~VE BEEN 
SUPPRESSED FOR FAILURE OF THE STATE TO MEET THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 
76-10-1212(3), REQUIRING A HEARING TO DETE~iINE 
WHETHER THE MATERIALS SEIZED ARE, IN FACT, PORNO-
GRAPHIC. 
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Section 76-10-1212(3) 
provides: 
In the event that a search warrant is issued and 
material alleged to be p~rnographic is seized under 
the provisions of this Section, any person claiming 
to be in possession of this material or claiming 
ownership of it at the time of its seizure may file 
a notice in writing with the Magistrate within ten 
days after the date of the seizure, alleging that the 
material is not pornographic. The Magistrate shall 
set a hearing within seven days after the filing of 
this notice, or at such other time as the claimant 
might agree. At this hearing evidence may be presented 
as to whether there is probable cause to believe the 
material is pornographic, and at the conclusion of the 
hearing, the Magistrate shall make a further determina-
tion of whether probable cause exists to believe that 
the material is pornographic. A decision as to whether 
there is probable cause to believe the seized material 
is pornographic shall be rendered by the Court within 
two days after the conclusion of the hearing. If, at the 
hearing the Magistrate finds that no probable cause exists 
to believe that the material is pornographic, then the 
material shall be returned to the person or persons from 
whom it was seized. 
The defendant Jordan filed a Notice of Claim that Material 
Seized is not Pornographic on the 9th day of November, 1981, well 
within the ten day limitation of the statute (T.7). However, no 
hearing was held by the Magistrate as required, nor was any hearing 
ever held other than the trial which addressed the requirements of 
Section 76-10-1212(3). 
This Court considered the above-cited statute in State vs. 
Piepenburg, supra, 602 P.2d 702, at 706, where the Court found 
that the defendant could not assert the failure to hold a Section 
76-10-1212(3) hearing as error where he did not comply with the 
statute by filing the notice. In the present case, the notice 
was filed timely as provided by the statute. 
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The United States Supreme Court in Heller vs. New York, 
413 U.S. 483, held that no right existed to a prior hearing to 
determine obscenity in all cases, but did recognize a right to 
a prompt judicial determination of obscenity issues after the 
seizure. In the present case, the procedures established to 
afford a prompt determination were not complied with and no 
determination was actually made prior to trial. 
The failure of the State to comply with the statutory and 
constitutional safeguards required by Heller vs. New York, and 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Section 76-10-1212(3) 
constitutes a substantial denial of the Fourth Amendment rights 
of the defendants, especially in the present case where only a 
limited number of items seized could conceivably come within the 
perimeters of the statute under which the defendants were charged 
and where only a few of the materials seized were admitted as 
evidence at the trial. Defendants' Motion to Suppress Evidence 
should have been granted by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment and verdict of the trial court should be 
reversed because the law under which the defendants were convicted 
is unconstitutionally overbroad and unconstitutionally vague; and 
the law should be declared null and void. In the alternative, 
this Court should reverse the trial court on the grounds that 
the photographic evidence used at trial was illegally seized and 
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illegally held pending trial, and therefore should have been 
suppressed. 
Respectfully submitted this ~day of June, 19 82. 
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Attorney for Appellants 
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APPENDIX A 
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